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TOWARD IDEATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
THE NOTIONS OF COMMON GOOD AND OF 
THE STATE IN LATE 19TH CENTURY SOCIAL LIBERALISM 
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the 
state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to 
collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social 
liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage 
collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible 
groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of 
F. H. Bradley, ethics of T. H. Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet, 
analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and 
utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of 
emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that 
the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and 
society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, 
i.e. the idea of the welfare state.
Introduction 
What is the relation between collective action and the state? Are their natures 
autonomous, intertwined or is there a ground to assert a single, coherent na-
ture? These questions seem as important today as they ever were in the ages 
of social and political turmoil. Today’s challenges of global security, econom-
ic stability, and quality of democracy in the context of a competition between 
neoliberal minimal and nation states on one hand and civic movements on the 
other are perpetually being discussed in academic circles, failing to provide a 
viable solution. If history of political ideas teaches us anything, that is when 
faced with the situation of intellectual conundrums, with no solution to be found 
anywhere, one should return to the classical writings to find at least an inspira-
tion to remain on the problem-solving path. I’m not arguing that a solution for 
today’s problems of society and the state can be found in classical writing, albeit 
that one can trace the source of current intellectual crisis and start from there. 
One of the forgotten corridors of the history of ideas that had a sheer im-
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century British social liberalism. This period, also referred to as British ideal-
ism period (Botcher and Vincent 2000), starts around 1870 and becomes key 
intellectual discourse in sociology and political philosophy, right up to late 
1920. It is a period of intellectual attempts to combine and reconcile idealism 
and empiricism in philosophy, facts and norms in sociology and liberty and 
obligation in political philosophy in times when liberalism was heavily con-
tested by socialism, whilst nationalism, racism and imperialism were starting 
to emerge as a menace for the future of mankind. The answer of British social 
liberalism to these threats was rather unique to some extent: they offered an 
account of human perfection by using potentials of institutional configurations 
of the state, trying to walk a thin line between liberty and authoritarianism. 
The uniqueness of social liberal accounts of the time lies in their basic postu-
lates that (a) a society is composed of leveled realities, some being higher than 
others, implying that (b) the goal of the state is to provide institutional settings 
for reaching “the highest reality”, steering a course for (c) self-perfection of an 
individual to evolve into an active citizen that strives to become the part of 
such reality, as the moral imperative of a civilized society. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the postulates of British social liberal-
ism in order to describe the theoretical nature of the state in the late 19th cen-
tury British social liberalism texts. I argue that British social liberalism set the 
foundations of what is later termed as welfare state, by giving justification of 
the state in a philosophical form that promotes the idea of liberty by creating 
social conditions for human self-perfection. What makes this justification po-
litical in its nature is that the promotion of this idea is done institutionally by 
the state; put differently, social policies that promote the common good such 
as free and equal education, medical care, social welfare for the poor etc., are 
political in their nature because a sovereign body imposes them as an obliga-
tion, represented by the law and coerced by the force. Since my approach is 
conceptual and analytical, and not historical, I do not follow the chronolog-
ical development of the ideas of British social liberalism. Rather, I start from 
the philosophical account of leveled realities (F. H. Bradley), connecting this 
account with the idea of moral self-perfection of man as an obligation (T. H. 
Green), melding these accounts into a theory of state that uses its institution-
al agencies to promote common good as the highest form of social reality and 
the true motivation for collective action (B. Bosanquet).  
Intellectual Order of Realities
British philosophical and social thought after the French revolution was dom-
inated by utilitarianism and empiricsm, which merged into what is sometimes 
referred to as “philosophic radicalism” (Freeden and Stears 2013: 993). In a nut-
shell, the radicals argued that all ideas of a man and his position and ends in 
a society have their origin in his experiences and feelings while the mind has 
only a secondary role in classifying and calculating ideas. Two types of feel-
ings are crucial in determining and explaining human action: ones of pleasure 
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and pain. Therefore, human beings are acting rational and being happy when 
they pursue pleasures and avoid pains. When it comes to a society, one can 
say that one lives in a good society, when all actions are taken into consider-
ation, there is more pleasure then pain. Such society treasures liberty above 
all other values, since only a free man can choose actions that can ultimately 
bring him joy and not sorrow. 
This (simplified) description of utilitarianism came under revision once He-
gel’s works were translated into English, in mid 19th century. Combined with J. 
S. Mill’s liberalism and buttressed from the need for liberalism to find a modus 
vivendi with socialism, sprang British social liberalism. From this new liberal-
ism’s point of view, classification of ideas cannot be the only role that the mind 
has. If that were the case, it would imply that ideas are determined by expe-
rience and cannot have a development of their own. Put differently, utilitari-
anism reduced ideas to psychological states, making them contingent and not 
universal (Hylton 1990: 59 – 61). The peak of utilitarianism’s psychologization 
of ideas came in Mill’s (2011: 813 – 823) works on logic and epistemology. For 
those reasons, the critique of the philosophical radicals from social liberalism 
perspective had to start from reconfiguring the relation between experience 
and ideas. However, their aim was not simply epistemological in its nature, that 
is, British idealists didn’t want only to answer the question about the origins 
of our knowledge. They were aiming at the level of ontology: what constitute 
the reality around us and therefore, what kind of objects exist in the world.  
The philosophical and ontological revision of empiricism reached its peak 
in works of F. H. Bradley. To some extent forgotten today, Bradley’s works on 
the nature of our knowledge and of the reality were widely appraised, inso-
much that decades after his major publications, no one seriously took into a 
task to revise the speculation about the mind that he postulated. The starting 
point of Bradley’s revision of empiricism is in the reduced role of mind to the 
classification of acts. He argues (Bradley 1908: 330) that the confusion in em-
piricism regarding what mind can and cannot do derives from the fact that 
mind indeed cannot create a perceptible world of its own. He acknowledges 
the facts that what we can feel with our senses are undeniable truths, albeit, 
from that it doesn’t follow that mind has no ontological role in constituting the 
world around us. Put differently, empiricism creates a gap between our mind 
and the reality, the one that Bradley was trying to close (Ellis 2005: 104). His 
argument is metaphysical in its nature, since it’s arguing for the mind and re-
ality to be parts of a totality or the whole that we refer to as the truth. The role 
of the mind consists of giving meaning to the facts that we acquire from the 
“outside” world. Bradley concludes that facts are subjected to interpretations, 
which can change their meaning to the very core, making “foundation in truth 
(…) provisional merely” (Bradley 1909: 335). Put differently, mind cannot alter 
the existence of the facts, albeit it can change the meanings what does facts mean 
for human agents and thus asserting relativism instead of crude determinism. 
The question that lies in the foundation of Bradley’s revision is the one about 
the nature of the truth. The truth is a matter of coherence, and coherence is 
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achieved through what Bradley (1909: 330) refers to as “the test of the system”. 
The test consists of ascribing a meaning to the facts by the mind, i.e. “the same 
act that transforms psychological images into logical ideas or meanings” (Allard 
2005: 56). In doing so, the mind places a given fact into a preexisting intel-
lectual “world-order” of the subject (Bradley 1909: 336). The outcome of such 
test is to verify weather new or old facts have an action related impact on the 
subject. If the fact cannot fit into a preexisting intellectual order, weather it is 
a new or old fact, it must be expelled from the mind. The fact doesn’t cease to 
exist, albeit it becomes of lesser importance for the truth regarding the world. 
From there, Bradley developed the idea of lower and higher form of realities, 
higher being the ones that are closer to the truth and whose interpretation of 
facts are more action-driving.
As Boucher and Vincent (2000: 69) conclude, “Bradley’s ontology was par-
ticularistic, communitarian and Hegelian”. The ontological account of multi-lev-
eled realities served as a foundation for ethics and political philosophy of Brit-
ish social liberalism. Although the nature of liberalism was already significantly 
changed in the works of T.H. Green, it was Bradley who gave them formal and 
philosophical shape. The central theme of social liberalism’s ethics and political 
philosophy is summarized in the idea of self-realization, the one that can be only 
realized with state’s intervention. In his Ethical Studies, Bradley (1951: 99) con-
nects the idea of multi-leveled reality with moral self-realization in a flowing way: 
“We have self-realization left as the end, the self so far being defined as neither 
a collection of particular feelings nor an abstract universal. The self is to be re-
alized as something not simply one or the other; it is to be realized further as 
will, will not being merely the natural will, or the will as it happens to exist and 
finds itself here or there, but the will as the good will, i.e., the will that realizes 
an end which is above this or that man, superior to them, and capable of con-
fronting them in the shape of a law or an ought.”
There are at least three ethical notions that are key to understanding the 
role of state in British social liberalism account: self-realization as the end, the 
idea of good will, and the idea of the common good ((given both in its norma-
tive (ought) and positive (law) form)). The idea of self-realization is prima facie 
moral foundation of liberalism. Both classical and utilitarian liberal doctrines 
argued for liberty as the key means and an end to achieving the best in a sub-
ject so that he or she may become a good citizen. Bradley accept the liberal 
tradition but refuses to reduce self-realization acts to collection of feelings, 
that of sense of pain or pleasure. Instead, self-realization is a part of human 
agency, and the key of self-realization is in acting and not in binary calculus of 
hurts and joys. For Bradley (1951: 13), both experiences are equally important 
for self-realization of a man, since the self is always and necessary “the whole 
self”. One achieves self only when one reaches the limits of its self-realization 
as the highest form of one’s social reality. 
The criteria for validating that the self-realization process is completed 
by acquiring the quality of good will. Whilst the self-realization process is 
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consisted out of acting, the good will is a universal principle that is know-
able only by the means of the mind. What makes this notion an ethical one is 
that it exceeds the particular need of a subject, treating its desires and ends as 
only secondary, and argues for higher reality. It is in the higher order of real-
ity where a subject realizes that a morally founded intersubjective relation is 
of higher importance for the development of the society as whole than his or 
her individual interests. Not every subject can realize this ethical end, since 
people are limited by their natural intellectual abilities; therefore, a political 
principle of obligation needs to be added into the social account of liberalism. 
The argument of self-realization as the subject’s end is buttressed by the the-
ory of human imperfection. The theory is common in liberal doctrine, but the 
solution of human imperfection provided by British social liberalism is unique. 
Rules and regulations are necessary to protect human beings from doing harm 
to each other. The negative perception of the law implies the negative accep-
tance of political obligation: I’m not obliged to give legitimacy to any law that 
is interfering in my actions, if those actions are not causing damage to proper-
ty of the others. Social liberalism accepts that human moral imperfection re-
quires the existence of laws, albeit it redefines its negative dimension toward 
positive form of political obligation. For them, political obligation is a sort of 
moral engineering process, that pari passu protects from harm and develops 
human agents to reach their full potential. 
In Bradley’s account of ethics, one can only find some pieces of the puzzle 
how political obligation leads to moral perfection. I already quoted Bradley’s 
idea of the good will being materialized in acts of (normative) customs and 
laws. He makes no distinctive difference between these forms, only states that 
they are a part of what he refers to as “the social organism” (Bradley 1951: 104). 
The organicistic nature of society and of a subject is seen through their inter-
twining: “Personal morality and political and social institutions cannot exist 
apart, and (in general) the better the one the better the other. The community is 
moral because it realizes personal morality; personal morality is moral because 
and in so far as it realizes the moral whole” (Bradley 1951: 104). Therefore, only 
by accepting the duties that are prescribed by the state through the law, one 
can become the best version of oneself; and vice versa, only by nurturing the 
good citizens, state coercive actions acquire its legitimacy: “Within the mo-
ment of the ‘social organism’, there is quite definitely a different ontology at 
work, which could hardly be called crude sociological determinism. Basically, 
the self-realising individual is not asked to personally invent a moral content, 
conversely, the content comes to the individual in a pre-existing form of life” 
(Boucher and Vincent 2000: 73). The idea of social organism is buttressed by 
Hegelian idea of the objective mind (Boucher and Vincent 2000: 74), i.e. that 
what defines society and the state is the effort to promote the ideas of human-
ism, and not the bare idea of monopoly of power. For that reason, the notion 
of political obligation is treated as an antithesis of liberty, making a dialecti-
cal twist toward a synthesis that leads to ethical notion of the society as the 
main end of social liberals. 
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Political Obligation, Moral Epistemology and Human Perfection 
Bradley’s conceptualization of reality is characterized by a mind-object dual-
ism. In order for this kind of epistemology to work properly, ontology needs 
to consist of a coherence between the ideas of the mind and the properties 
of an object that is a subject of knowledge. The question that remained open 
in Bradley’s philosophy is what are social and political consequences of such 
ontology? It seems clear that in constructing a world from the perspective of 
British idealism, one needs to take into account a coherence between univer-
sality and particularity. How to fill this general notion with political content 
in order to correct liberal political philosophy and its views on state and soci-
ety, making liberalism more humanistic? 
From a history of political ideologies perspective, the question was per-
ceived as a crucial one in the period of the late 19th century. Although 19th cen-
tury is considered in most textbooks to be a century of liberalism, it is safe to 
say that in Great Britain as its cradle, liberalism was going through a severe 
crisis in the last three decades of 19th century (Freeden and Stears 2013). Lib-
eral policies were heavily contested from both left and right side of ideologi-
cal specter. Benjamin Disraeli’s paternalism demonstrated that liberalism can-
not ignore the fact of modernization that modern nation state is developing 
in an opposite direction from the idea of the minimal state. And from the left 
side of the ideological specter, socialist movements showed that growing in-
fluence of worker unions and their demands for social rights is a consequence 
of laisses faire politics of the free market. The pressure from the left and the 
right pushed liberalism toward center of ideological specter, making it more 
conservative in defending its core ideas, and changed the face of its devotion 
for progress. It is well known that liberal intellectual elite of that period were 
concentrated around Fabian society of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, a British 
version of social democrats who believed in a vision of evolutive socialistic 
revolution by using liberal institution and thus avoiding the violence and ma-
jor political disasters. The new liberal formula was that if every living being is 
entitled by natural rights, the first end of a society is to make conditions for 
everyone to practice their God given rights. And who can better insure these 
conditions than the state, as the highest power in a society. Put in a more con-
ceptual terms, the goal of social liberals was to provide a legitimacy account 
for practicing coercion as a means to interfere into person’s life in order to 
enable him or her to become the best version of themselves, i.e. to achieve the 
end of self-perfection.  
The change in ideological core of liberalism led to the need of redefinition 
of the concept of liberty, i.e. the substantial differentiation from the one that 
was used in classical and utilitarian liberalism. It is often argued that this task 
was taken by T. H. Green, resulting in the concept of positive liberty, i.e. the 
one that reconciles coercion with individual freedom. In his account made in 
The Principle of Political Obligation, the starting position is a classical liberal 
one that only lawful actions may constrain one’s free action in order to allow 
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him or her to make no harm to others or himself (Green 1999: 5). Green is ex-
ploring where are the limits of legitimacy of constraint. Put formally: to which 
extent is it justifiable to condition that one must do X in order to achieve p, 
q… n that leads to his or her self-perfection; and in which context such justi-
fication make sense? For Green (1999: 6), justification can be deduced only if 
the object of intention has moral qualities, i.e. if coercing a person to act in 
a particular way X to obtain the qualities p, q… n of an object O (p, q… n are 
necessarily described by the society as good), then the final result of agent’s 
adoption of qualities of O is his or her self-perfection. 
However, goodness of O is necessary but not sufficient condition for self-per-
fection. The human (cognitive) imperfection may significantly limit the ability 
of a person to recognize goodness in O (Green 1999: 7). Again, this is a critique 
of a classical liberalism and its endorsement of empiricism. If my interests are 
related to the object O, and not its qualities, it becomes quite difficult to explain 
the value of O both for the agent and the community, respectfully. Put differ-
ently “it would be fallacious to draw conclusions about the agent’s own good 
from claims about the goods she pursues. This seems to conflate the content and 
ownership of desires. Moreover, it makes an agent’s interest in others depen-
dent on her contingent desires; it does not explain why an agent who does not 
have such desires is making a mistake or why one who does have these desires 
should retain them” (Brink 2007: 42). To make goodness of O explicit for all 
members of the community, a political engineering needs to be put in motion.
Bradley’s and Green’s theory merge here. The coherence of knowledge of 
social reality is achieved when the abstract universalistic element is replaced 
with natural rights and particularistic one with that of positive law. In that re-
spect, Green’s inquiry is to define what makes a positive law good. Compara-
tively, in a utilitarian account, a law is good when it makes no harm to subjects 
of law, i.e. when it is in no clash with natural rights. However, as above-men-
tioned, this account explains only one feature of law, its intension: the role of 
a law is reduced to preserving the sense of natural rights. In that respect, the 
utilitarian theory of law is descriptive in its nature. What Green (1999: 14) is 
asserting is that a theory of law needs to include a justification criteria of ob-
ligation, that is, extension that is purely moral or prescriptive: “in what ways 
and how far do the main obligations enforced and rights maintained by law 
in all civilised societies contribute to the moral end described—to establish 
those conditions of life in which a true, i.e., a disinterested or unselfish, mo-
rality shall be possible?”. In order to constitute such a theory of political obli-
gation, Green needs to construct a sort of moral epistemology as a standpoint 
from which he can verify its premises. 
The key question behind Green’s moral epistemology is on the matter of 
both knowing the qualities of an object and interpreting a moral sense of them. 
Green argues that perception of the qualities of an object are possible due to its 
accumulation of meanings across the time. Every socially conceivable object 
has its own history and accumulated meanings, implying that perception allows 
us to describe the qualitative features of it. This part of Green’s epistemology 
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is in line with empiricism; what goes under the part of interpretation can be 
summarized in the question of what makes qualities of an object moral? Note 
here that “meaning” is taken in plural, following the possibility of multitude 
of interpretations of the same object. Methodologically speaking, how we can 
verify that the accumulated meanings of the object of our enquiry are moral 
in their nature? If we take that verification in British idealism is tied to coher-
ence, the answer to the question needs to include an overlap of experience and 
the mind. There must be some general notion of goodness that is always trig-
gered by the senses, and that notion verifies weather the accumulated mean-
ings have moral values for agents or not. When the coherence of universal 
goodness and particular good of an object is set, it can be inferred that actions 
of the one who is using the object are also good. It is clear that these types of 
actions go beyond the descriptive feelings of pleasure or pain – they are pre-
scriptive in their nature, concentrating on issues of right and wrong. Finally, 
the focus of Green’s (1999: 8) moral epistemology is on actions and their con-
sequences for the human progress: “They arise as the individual’s conception 
of the society on the well-being of which his own depends, and of the constit-
uents of that well-being, becomes wider and fuller; and they are embodied in 
the laws, institutions, and social expectation, which make conventional mo-
rality. This growth of conventional morality forms the ‘moral progress of man-
kind.’ But it must be remembered that a merely conventional morality is not a 
true morality; that it becomes so only in so far as upon habits disciplined by 
conformity to conventional morality there supervenes an intelligent interest 
in some of the objects contributory to human perfection, which that conven-
tional morality subserves and in so far as that interest becomes the dominant 
interest of the character.”
As can be seen from the cited section, Green argues that acting in the name 
of progress is more than doing self-perfection acts, it ultimately leads to well-be-
ing of all members of a society. Such activism is the one that constitutes the 
core meaning of the concept of “good citizen”, the one willing to dedicate to 
political participation and spreading political liberties. Therefore, being a cit-
izen is a higher form of social reality than of being an individual. Again, coher-
ence principle requires that citizen’s actions are in a relation with particular 
type of social object. Green terms it as the common good, ascribing it social 
and political meaning that is applicable only in the frames of a community, 
differentiating it from the idea of a morally good. 
If all moral actions are in the end valued through social acts (to use Green’s 
term, external acting), then Green’s moral epistemology is relativistic in its 
nature, rejecting crude determinism (Brink 2007: 110). The key redefinition of 
classical liberalism here is in refuting the idea of universal natural rights: they 
are always relative to the society in which they are practiced. As Dimova-Cook-
son (2001: 132) points out, Green’s notion of rights is based on a social recogni-
tion act: “Green argues against the idea of natural rights as he does not believe 
that we can speak about the individual in a meaningful way without taking 
into account her social environment. He claims that rights exist to the extent 
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that they are recognised by society.“ Green is not arguing that freedom or life 
are not universal rights of human beings, albeit that there are social realities in 
which these rights are only secondary to other social goods, such as property, 
nation, or God’s will. As stated before, social realities can be improved or con-
structed, where a dialectical dynamic of coherence takes place in explication: 
by determining that some natural rights have a greater value than others, and 
using the tools of the mind to establish the intellectual order of importance, ac-
tive citizen can cancel the exiting social order of goods and create a new social 
reality. Active citizens, therefore, are a vital component for a good community: 
“The citizen, for Green, was not simply the passive recipient of rights, but rath-
er an active self-realising being. Green viewed all political concepts from this 
standpoint. Rights, obligations, property or freedom were devices to allow in-
dividuals to realise their powers and abilities” (Boucher and Vincent 2000: 29). 
Returning to rights, in Green’s (1999: 87) political philosophy, they have a 
meaning only when they are in a coherence with obligations. That is why a co-
ercive mechanism, i.e. institutions of the state, need to be introduced to pro-
tect the rights by forcing obligations. Not only in Green’s political philosophy, 
albeit in every British social liberalism text that deals with the state, the main 
question is always related to making a balance between voluntary moral be-
havior and behavior conditioned from the fear of the punishment. For Green 
(1999: 88), fear is never sufficient to make a person accept obligations defined 
by the law, he or she necessarily have to have a sense for moral duty to act as 
a responsible citizen. Such a sense is derived from the notion of social good, 
that is the knowledge of one’s own rights: “Thus the state, or the sovereign as 
a characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives fuller 
reality to rights already existing. It secures and extends the exercise of pow-
ers, which men, influenced in dealing with each other by an idea of common 
good, had recognised in each other as being capable of direction to that com-
mon good, and had already in a certain measure secured to each other in con-
sequence of that recognition. It is not a state unless it does so.” (Green 1999: 99)
The state needs to have an end in order to be defined and recognized as a 
sovereign one. Such an end is relative to the society in which coercion is be-
ing practiced albeit, what is equal for all societies is that the “fuller reality” 
is measured by success of the state of imposing obligations defined by laws. 
The final concern raised here is then connected with the end and the method 
achieving it. It is clear that in terms of a method, legitimate state actions are 
reducible to lawful ones, i.e. the state acts by enacting and conducting the laws. 
The end is, however, determined by the notion of a common good, which is a 
universal value since each society has one, yet relative to the particular soci-
ety’s culture and tradition. Put differently, laws are endogenous to a society, 
derived from the notion of natural rights that are in coherence with the soci-
ety’s moral culture. The justification criteria for every law is purely moral in 
its nature, whereas means to conducting them are political. 
Political legitimacy in Green’s political philosophy has little to do with the 
form of enacting laws, rather with lawmaker’s (moral) intention. By imposing 
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obligations via law, the state is shaping the behavior of subjects of law to do 
good, i.e. conducting their actions in such a way to make contribution to com-
mon good of the society (Green 1999: 87). In practical terms, the state’s duty is 
to impose such obligations in its social policies that lead to self-improvement of 
its citizens, such as general literacy, health care, free voting, free press, work-
ers’ rights, but also imposing certain versions of national history, patriotism, 
security measures etc. If treated as the means to the common good, coercion 
in Green’s conception of liberty is legitimate, as long as it makes individuals 
realize that their own conception of reality and good life can be raised to a 
higher level, making them coherent with “fuller reality”, one that living in a 
civilized society entails.
The Political State of Freedom
Although Green provides a justification criterion for political obligation from 
the moral point of view, it is still unclear why should I accept to be coerced to 
certain actions and necessarily give up parts of my freedom. Classical liber-
alism tried to solve this problem by reducing the role of the state to minimal 
actions, while Green introduced an external moral condition (the common/
social good). Which of these solutions are better for the state actions is a mat-
ter of ideological standpoint that dominates the society; both, however, fail to 
answer the question regarding individuals and their relation to the political – 
why should any of us accept any kind of coercion? It is this question that lies 
in the core of Bernard Bosanquet’s philosophical theory of state, the one in 
which social liberalism’s notion of the state reached its peak. 
Bosanquet’s theory of the state is philosophical for the reason of focusing 
on the questions of ontology, i.e. social reality. By the time Bosanquet’s book 
The Philosophical Theory of State was published, moral and philosophical epis-
temological framework was firmly established for over a decade by Green and 
Bradley, respectfully. Purely political issues in their multi-level philosophy of 
reality were, however, left unanswered, which lead to unsolved paradox of po-
litical obligation. For Bosanquet (2001: 49), this paradox is best demonstrat-
ed in liberal idea of self-government. In utilitarianism, the idea has twofold 
meaning: individual and collective. Bosanquet argues that both levels deter-
mine the type of obligation paradox which haunts liberalism, respectfully: on 
the individual level, it is an ethical paradox of obligation; and on the collective 
it is a political one. Both of these are perhaps most visible in J. S. Mill’s works. 
In On Liberty, Mill (1975) puts forward his famous argument on individual 
self-government (i.e. autonomy), which is based on negative notion of freedom. 
Mill defends the idea of free society as the one in which every man is free to 
act in his best interest as long as he or she do no harm to the others. Mill de-
fends this notion by setting a core of basic (not natural) rights that each society 
should accept as a necessary condition of progress. However, this optimistic 
view that each man shall always do what is best for him and (at least) not inter-
fere with others is in a collision with the idea of collective self-government. As 
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Simendić (2011: 245) judiciously notes, to constitute the best form of govern-
ment, Mill introduces a two-step procedure: a psychological theory of human 
desires for happiness and a specific view of collective progress.  Seminal image 
of liberal society as an aggregation of individual interests to increase overall 
happiness implies that political forms of government need to be in coherence 
with notions of autonomy at the individual level. For that reason, in Consid-
erations on Representative Government Mill (1975) passionately defends rep-
resentation as a political form of self-government in which an individual, by 
act of voting, willingly transfers his political rights to a representative, who in 
turn becomes a political person, autonomous in his actions, and with an end 
to make progress in a society. A collection of these representatives makes a 
sovereign body that enacts laws, necessarily conducting and coercing behav-
ior of individuals in order to achieve the end, i.e. the progress of a society. The 
paradox becomes quite clear: in order to achieve greater political freedoms, 
one must give up his own active and passive political right for a certain period 
of time (until next elections). The utilitarian justification for this is that rep-
resentation and laws are a necessary evil, albeit the minimal one (Bosanquet 
2001: 50). Social liberals don’t settle with this kind of argument and seek fur-
ther justification for political obligation. In Bosanquet work in particular, the 
aim is to reconcile collective and individual liberties by not minimalizing the 
powers and authority of the state on one hand, and actively encourage politi-
cal participation of the citizens on the other.  
When questioning the nature of obligation and its relation to sovereign po-
litical body, Bosanquet argues that the key ontological criteria for establishing 
a higher social reality is not reducible to epistemological coherence between 
individual and collective autonomy, i.e. between practices and the reason, or 
at least it is not a sufficient condition. For him, the act of constituting a sover-
eign body is not so much in transferring our political rights, albeit in transfer-
ring our rights to act. Being natural, our rights are always in our property and 
cannot be transferred – one cannot transfer its right to be free or alive. How-
ever, our actions, being necessarily social, are not necessarily in our property. 
For Bosanquet, actions can be willingly subjected to a higher will that directs 
them toward achieving greater social good. Put differently, in order to solve 
the paradox of political obligation, Bosanquet introduces a notion of will. His 
argument consists of detailed analysis of Rousseau’s idea of general will and 
reconceptualizing it from moral to an ontological concept. What makes will 
an ontological criterion is that by transferring multiple individual wills to the 
sovereign body, a collective will is being established: “Our purpose, therefore, 
is to explain what is meant by saying that ‘a will’ can be embodied in the State, 
in society, in law and institutions; and how it is possible for the individual, as 
we know him, to be in an identity with this will, such as continually to vary, 
but never wholly to disappear. How can a man’s real self lie in a great degree 
outside his normal self, and be something which he only now and then gets 
hold of distinctly, and never completely?” (Bosanquet 2001: 106).
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Bosanquet’s aim surpasses classical liberal and utilitarian image of the state 
and society as an aggregation of individual interests; he seeks “an identity” 
between the state and an individual. This identity is achieved once individu-
al solves his or her internal ethical paradox of obligation, i.e. when they real-
ize that their happiness is limited by their own natural talents for acquiring it. 
Bosanquet argues that his standpoint sheds a new light on the need for liberty 
to be put in certain limits, not because individuals are a danger for each other, 
albeit because of our own individual biological and psychological limitations. 
Each man achieves happiness when realizes what are his or her “fundamental 
logic of will” (Bosanquet 2001: 123), i.e. intellectual and social capacities for 
acting for happiness. What Bosanquet is pointing out are individual’s limits to 
realize its own desires and wants in light of their own development: “For Bosan-
quet, the way humans organise elements in their own minds is analogous to the 
way social groups are organised. The associated crowd is often unaware of the 
ideas which motivate it. The organisation, however, is aware of the dominant 
operative ideas. Society is considered by Bosanquet as a vast conglomerate of 
such systems of ideas, some more conscious than others. Each group, trade or 
profession has its own dominant themes” (Boucher and Vincent 2000: 107). 
In defining the capacities of the human development, classical and social 
liberalism are sharply divided: while the former argues for almost unlimited 
potential for individual progress, the latter takes a more moderate approach 
admitting that progress is limited by the need of those who are acting in the 
name of it. This is, however, only at the level of individual action. In the the-
ory of social liberalism, from the collective action level seen, potential for hu-
man development is practically unlimited. As Allard (2005: 144) shows, this has 
to do with a fact that “knowledge grows over time as it progressively revises 
and enlarges itself” creating an analogy between development and “the ideal 
for of the organic system”. This is why Bosanquet (2001: 121-122) sets twofold 
role of the state in his political philosophy account that overarches the classi-
cal minimal role (protection): one task is to create conditions for happiness of 
all people; the other is to show individuals what are their limits and therefore, 
what is their place in a society. Coercion is not the only way to realize these 
ends, they can also be done by “automatism and suggestion”. In these three 
ways, the state gives social meaning to our action, making them intentional. 
The will of the state in Bosanquet’s account is determined by the notion of 
common good, the same idea that was delineated by Green before. The differ-
ence is the way how we can identify the common good. For Green, we find it 
in laws, i.e. the ones that endured the test of time and accumulated the moral 
meaning. For Bosanquet (2001: 125), the common good is a matter of collec-
tive actions. Laws only conduct acting in certain ways, making actions socially 
acceptable. They are not the embodiment of the common good, albeit repre-
sentation of it. Therefore, Bosanquet (2001: 131) defines political obligation as 
a principle “according to which laws and institutions represented a real self or 
general will, recognised by individuals as implied in the common good which 
was imperative upon them.“ The imperative actions defined by common good 
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and the laws have a function to “liberate recourses of the character” (Bosan-
quet 2001: 127). The common good is not found, it is created by putting peo-
ple in certain routines which make them good citizens. These kind of state 
actions Bosanquet (2001: 129; 131) terms “hindrance of hindrances”: “Thus we 
may say that every law and institution, every external fact maintained by the 
public power, must be judged by the degree in which it sets at liberty a growth 
of mind and spirit. It is a problem partly of removing obstacles to growth, and 
partly of the division of labour between consciousness and automatism.”
Bosanquet (2001: 128) argues for a “determined growth.” It is a type of col-
lective action which leads to progress, both on individual (increasing intellec-
tual capacities) and collective level (creating common good). What is specific 
for Bosanquet and social liberals is that a strategy for achieving a determi-
nate growth is a top down one. It is the state that should motivate individuals 
to become the best version of themselves. Taken in historical context of the 
turn of the century, this is not an unreasonable request. The state should use 
its institutional resources to motivate individuals to take active participation 
in social life by razing general literacy, life and work conditions, etc. Free ed-
ucation, free health care, social programs for unemployed workers, regula-
tions of the free market, regulations in the field of political competition, cor-
rection facilities as resocialization institutions and not those of punishment 
are just some of the institutional means that state can put into motion. This 
kind of state is the one that has a positive influence on liberties, it actively 
encourages individuals to expand them (Bosanquet 2001: 131). As Bosanquet 
(2001: 132) puts, it is still on the individuals themselves to define their actions 
in the way that transforms them into active citizen, while the purpose of the 
state is purely moral: “The end of the State is a moral purpose, imperative 
on its members. But its distinctive action is restricted to removing hindranc-
es to the end, that is, to lending its force to overcome —both in mind and in 
externals essential to mind— obstacles which otherwise would obstruct the 
realisation of the end.”
Concluding Remarks 
British social liberalism was a pioneer and a unique attempt to reconcile the 
growing power of the state and emerging social movements in the second half 
of the 19th century. There are at least three standpoints from which we can 
define this type of social liberalism. From a philosophical standpoint, British 
social liberalism is an attempt to understand and reconcile new emerging so-
cial realities that go beyond the interests of individuals. From a political per-
spective, these realities clash in their interest to gain control over the state, 
as the highest coercive power in the society. Finally, social liberalism recog-
nizes the importance of grass-root movements, i.e. the new emerging collec-
tive actions of the citizens. Both the state and civic movements are creating 
a dialectic of conflict, which social liberalism is trying to solve from ethical 
and political view.
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The second standpoint is, therefore, a merge of ethics and politics. Social 
liberalism believes that all collective actions can be beneficial for a society, if 
they are directed toward constituting the common good. As seen in Green’s 
arguments, for social liberals, this is only possible if social actions are conduct-
ed according to the law. Finally, a political standpoint provides arguments for 
accepting the political obligation derived from the law. Again, in a dialectical 
manner, the thesis, i.e. the state, is changed by the demands of the anti-thesis 
(social movements), becoming responsible for the legitimacy of all social ac-
tions, not just the ones concerning protection. The dialectic is shifting the role 
of state from negative to positive one, which in turn has an impact to one’s per-
ception of what freedom is. The general will and goodness of collective action 
is achieved only if the state involves itself in the lives of its citizens, showing 
them positive examples how to become the best versions of themselves, thus 
making a society of higher reality. 
What remains outside of British social liberalism conceptualization of the 
relation between the state and its citizens is the case of unwilling actions. What 
every social liberal is arguing for is a positive conditional that explicates that 
if the state acts good, the citizens will follow. The negative conditional is left 
unanswered however: if the state doesn’t act good, albeit it forces its citizens 
to make unwilling actions by using or threatening them with physical force, 
or suggesting them to behave in certain ways that are not in the best interest 
of the society by using (e.g.) media and education, is the coercion legitimate? 
The answer here is clearly negative and undefendable from a liberal point of 
view, i.e. there is no true liberal perspective that could provide an answer that 
can justify state’s action that forces individuals to behave in ways that are con-
trary to their interests and rights. Put differently, British social liberalism sees 
only a potential for goodness in the actions of the state, and not the dangers 
of its interventions into private life of the individuals. What social liberals 
somehow fail to notice is that social movements and citizens unsatisfaction 
and protests emerged for a reason. They saw them only as a potential social 
cleavage that needed to be bridged, and the state is the one that can construct 
that bridge. This overconfidence in the state’s good intention only led liberal-
ism to embrace more conservative stand, forgetting its progressive roots and 
becoming more tolerant to authoritarian options that allegedly defend free-
dom of collective entities. The idea of merging liberalism and socialism failed 
with the rise of the state as the solution for growing social tensions. For this 
reason, social liberalism failed to have more influence after the first genera-
tion of authors stopped publishing their works, and theoretically was revived 
only in the second half of the 20th century by redefining the positive influence 
of the state as the welfare state. 
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Bojan Vranić
Prema ideacionom kolektivnom delanju: ideje opšteg dobra  
i države u socijalnom liberalizmu kasnog 19. Veka
Apstrakt
Cilj ovog rada je analiza ideja opšteg dobra i države u britanskom socijalnom liberalizmu ka-
snog 19. veka i njihovog odnosa prema građanskom kolektivnom delanju. Autor pokazuje da 
su britanski socijalni liberali iznosili argumente u prilog državi koja koristi strategiju odozgo 
na dole da bi podstakla delanje koje transformiše pojedince u društveno odgovorne grupe, 
tj. dobre građane. Rad se fokusira na filozofske spise F. H Bredlija, etiku T. H. Grina i politič-
ku filozofiju B. Bosankea, analizirajući njihove pokušaje da rekonceptualizuju ideje klasičnog 
liberalizma i doktrine utilitarizma o pojedincu, društvu i državi a u svetlu rastućeg uticaja le-
vih društvenih pokreta. Autor pokazuje da su dela Britanskih socijalnih liberala temelj države 
i društva koje će dominirati liberalizmom u drugoj polovini 20. veka, tj. ideji o državi 
blagostanja.
Ključne reči: kolektivno delanje, prisila, socijalni liberalizam, sloboda
